Introduction
To choose intelligent courses of action, an agent must reason about the state of the world and the way in which actions affect the world. In realistic domains we cannot expect to have complete information, so a representation for reasoning about actions must be able to express uncertainty concerning the state of the world and the effects of actions and other events. For example, the statement "H I were to smoke, I would contract lung cancer some years down the road" can at best be said to hold with high like lihood. There are uncertain environmental factors that can influence my chance of contracting cancer as well as uncertainty in the effects of smoking.
In order to reason about the effects of actions, it is necessary to be able to reason about time. Facts tend to be true for periods of time and events oc cur at particular times. Actions comprising a plan may occur sequentially or concurrently. Actions and other events affect the future, but not the past. Chance evolves with time: the chance of rain tomor row may not be the same now as it will be tonight. Ambiguities in the world are resolved with time: be fore a fair coin is :flipped the chance of heads is 50% but after it is flipped it either certainly landed heads or it certainly did not.
We present a propositional temporal probability logic that can represent all of these aspects of time and chance. The logical language integrates both modal and probabilistic constructs and can thus rep resent and distinguish between possibility, probabil ity, and truth. For example, the language all ows us to write sentences that 1) describe concurrent actions:
• It is not possible for me to raise and lower my arm at the same time.
2) describe conditions during an action that influ ence the probabilistic effects of the action:
• H the oven temperature is constant while I am baking the souffle, the soufll e is likely to turn out right.
3) mix statements about probability and inevitabil ity:
• There is a 50% chance that at noon the train crash will be inevitable.
4) distinguish between truth and probability:
• I won the lottery even though it was unlikely. Numerous researchers have developed temporal logics for reasoning about plans and actions [Mc Dermott, 1982; Allen, 1984; Haas, 1985; Pelavin and .All en, 1986; Shoham, 1987] . Others have developed logics of probability [Fagin and Halpern, 1988; Bac chus, 1988] . But no work has addressed all theses issues in a comprehensive logical framework. Such a framework is necessary for representing and reason ing about plans in uncertain domains.
The theory literature contains several examples of logics that can represent both time and probability [Lehmann and Shelah, 1982; Hart and Shair, 1984; Halpern and Tuttle, 1989) . The focus of these log ics is on reasoning about probabilistic programs and distributed systems. The logics do not attempt to model aspects of causality or to distinguish between c:llif erent types of temporal objects such as facts and events; hence, they are not suitable for reasoning about actions and plans.
The logic presented here extends the capabilities of current planning logics by providing a probabilis tic treatment of causality, concurrent actions, and conditions that hold or change during execution of an action. The logic combines aspects of Pelavin 's [1988] temporal planning logic, van Fraa.ssen 's [1980] models of objective chance, and Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo's [1988] probability logic. This paper does not address some of the traditional planning issues such as qualification and persistence. These issues are beyond the scope of the present work. What the developed logic does is provide a framework within which to explore such issues for domains in which un certainty is a factor. Furthermore, this paper does not discuss complete axiomatizations of the logic. The logic presented is intended to be used as a tool in the representation of planning problems and the design and analysis of planning algorithms. The au thor does not believe that axioma.tizing the logic and feeding the axioms to a theorem prover is a reason able way to solve planning problems. Rather, we should strive to design special purpose planning al gorithms that are faithful to the semantics of the logic. This logic presented will enable us to do this for a new class of interesting and diffi cult planning problems and to prove the correctness of these algo rithms.
2
The Ontology
Time is modeled as a collection of world-histories, each representing one possible chronology or his tory of events throughout time. At any given point in time, some of the world-histories will naturally share a common past up to that time. Thus the world-histories can be formed into a tree structure that btanches into the future. Note that the:re is no special status given to the time "now", so the tempotal tree bta.nches into the future relative to each point in time. facts. This paper will deal with event types and for brevity will simply :refer to them as events.
The fact/event dichotomy just described is a sim plification of the true situation. As Shoham [1987] has shown, there are many c:llif erent types of facts and events, characterized by their temporal proper ties. Although Shoham's refined categories of fact types constitute a more useful and accurate picture of the world than the simple fact/event dichotomy, the fact/event categorization will be used for sim plicity of exposition. Extending the work to encom pass Shoham's categories is completely straightfor ward.
Uncertainty is represented by defining probabili ties over the tree of possible futures. Because the present work is concerned with representing proba bilistic effects, one talks about probability at a given point in time and probability is :represented in such a way that the probability of the past, relative to that point, is either zero or one. In this way, actions and other events can only affect the probabilities of future facts and events. This type of probability is objective, as opposed to subjective probability, with regard to which the past can be uncertain. For ex ample, subjectively I may be uncertain as to whether the train left on time or not, yet objectively it either certainly left or it certainly did not, and further more, there is nothing I can do now to change that. The other property imposed on objective probability is that the probability be completely determined by the history up to the current time. So probability is purely a function of the state of the world. This is in contrast to subjective probability where probability is a function not only of the state of the world but also of the epistemic state of an agent.
3 Syntax
To refer to facts and events occurring in time the language contains two predicates. HOLDS asso ciates a fact with the interval of time over which it is true and OCC associates an event with the interval over which it occurs. The language contains three modal operators to talk about inevitability, possi bility, and chance. The D operator designates in evitability and we write Dt(cf>) to indicate that cf> is necessarily true at time t. Possibility 0 is defined in terms of inevitability as Ot(cf>) = •Dt(•cf>). We write Ot(cf>) to say that cf> is possibly true at tinle t. The chance operator P designates the probability of a sentence at a given time. We write Pt(cf>) � a to say that the probability of cf> at time t is at least a. The sentence form Pt(cf>) :$ o: is used as a short hand for Pt(•cf>) � 1-a, and similarly =, >, and < are used. Following the syntax of Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo's [1988] probability logic of polynomial weight formulas, polynomial combinations of proba bility operators will be allowed. Thus the language can express things like "c/> is at least twice as likely as 1/J": Pt(cf>) � 2Pt('I/J). This is particularly useful for writing sentences about conditional probability. The probability of cf> given 1/J is defined as prob (c/> 11/1 ) = prob (cf> A 1/1 ) /prob ( ,P ).
If the probability of the conditioning sentence 1/J is zero, then the conditional probability is undefined.
In this case, a conditional probability sentence like prob (c/>11/J) = a can be assigned neither the value true nor the value false. Rather than introducing a new conditional probability operator and dealing with this truth assignment problem, sentences about conditional probability can simply be written in the form Pt(cf>A ,P ) � aPt( 'ifJ ). Note that the standard conditional probability nota tion will be used to syntactically denote a sentence of the above form:
Pt(cf> I'I/J ) �a.
The lexicon of the language consists of the follow ing three sets of nonlogical symbob: TC, a set of time point symbols; FACTS, a set of fact symbols; EVENTS, a set of event symbols.
The set of of well-formed formulas combining the logical and nonlogical symbols is recursively defined as follows: 149 1. If t1, t2 E TC then t1 = t2, t1 j t2, and t1 -< t2 are wffs. The four example sentences from the introduction can be represented as follows. In the first three sen tence below to, t1, t2, ta are time points such that (to -< t1 -< t2 -< ts) and to denotes the time "now".
• Oto[OCC(raise, it. t2) A OCC(Iower, t1. t2)]
• If the oven temperature is constant while I am baking the souffle, the souffle is likely to turn out right.
Pt0(HOLDS(souffle-done-right, t2, t2)l OCC(bake-souffle, t11 t2) A HOLDS(oven-temp-const, t1, t2)) � .9
• There is a 50% chance that at noon the train crash will be inevitable. (t1 =noon) A Pt0( Dt1DCC(t2, ta, crash))= .5
In the next sentence t0, t1, and t2 are all time points in the past and (to -< t1 -< t2).
• I won the lottery even though it was unlikely.
Pt0(0CC(tl, t2, win-lottery))= .0001 A OCC(t11 t2, win-lottery) 4 Semantics A model is a 7-tuple (W, T, FA, EV, R, P R, F),
where:
• W is the set of possible world-histories.
• T is a totally ordered set of time points, corre sponding to the reals.
• FA and EV range over subsets of 2 (TxT)xW des ignating the sets of domain elements of type fact and event, respectively.
• R is a :relation defined on T x W x W. R(t, w1, w2) means that world-histories w1 and w2 share a com mon past up to time t. The set of all world histories accessible from w at time t will be desig nated Rr.
• P R is a probability assignment function that as signs to each time t and world-history w a proba bility function p.r. • F is the denotation function that maps every time symbol to an element of T, every fact symbol to an element of FA, and every event symbol to an element of EV.
In section 2 the ontology of the logic was discussed from an intuitive standpoint. In order to obtain the desired intuitive properties, a number of constraints must be imposed on the models. These constraints Cl-6 are presented in the following discussion.
The future branching temporal tree is defi ned in terms of the R relation over world-histories. R re lates worlds-histories with common pasts. To cap ture the future branching nature of time we say that if two world-histories share a common past up to time t2 then they share a common past up to any earlier time:
(C1) H t1 < t2 and R(t2,w1,w2) then R(t1, w1,w2). Since R just represents the equality of histories up to a time t, for a fixed time R is an equivalence relation.
( C2) For a fixed time R is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric. Figure 1 illustrates how the R relation ties together the different world-histories to form the temporal tree structure.
Facts and events hold and occur in various world histories at various times. Thus, we identify facts and events with sets of (temporal interval, world} pairs. Following Shoham {1987), we take a temporal interval to be simply an ordered pair of time points. So a fact(event) is a set of elements of the form ((t1, t2}, w}, where t1, t2 E T, t1 � t2, and w E W. H ((t1,t2},w} E A then fact(event) A holds(occurs) during interval (t1, t2} in world-history w.
As mentioned earlier, facts and events differ in their temporal properties. This distinction is cap tured by the following semantic constraint which states that if a fact holds over an interval, it holds over all subintervals: 150 (C3) H t1 � t2 :5 ta � t4, t1 ¥= ta, t2 ¥= t4, fa E FA and ((tt,t.},w} E fa then ((t2,ta),w} E fa . To ensure consistency, the R accessibility relation must be compatible with the specifications in the model describing the facts that hold at different times and events that occur at diff erent times in each world-history. Because R relates world-histories with common pasts, if two world-histories are R re lated at time t, they must agree on all facts( events) that hold( occur) over intervals ending before or at the same time as t:
H t1 :5 t2 and R(t2, w1, w2) then ((to, t1}, Wt} E A iff ((to, t1),w2} EA.
In section 2, two desired characteristics of the proba bility operator were mentioned. The first is that the probability of a past fact or event should be either zero or one, depending on whether or not it actually happened. This is achieved by the following con straint.
(C5) JJ�(.Rf) = 1. Defining the probabilities in this way makes good in tuitive sense if we look at the meaning of R. R� des ignates a set of world-histories that are objectively possible with respect to w at time t. It is natural that the set of world-histories that are objectively likely with respect to w at time t should be a subset of the ones that are possible.
The second desired characteristic is that the prob ability at a time t be completely determined by the history up to that time. In other words, worlds that share a common past up to a given time t should share a common probability function at that time. This is again easily captured in terms of the R ac cessibility relation: (C6) H w1,w2 E Rf then JJ':1 = JJ':�. Given the models described above, the semantic def initions for the well-formed formulas are defined as follows. Note that the denotation of an expression <P relative to a model M and a world-history w is designated by [ <P]M , v .
(HOLDS(tt,t2,fa)]M,v =true iff
((F(tt),F(t2)},w } E F(la).
[OCC(h, t2, ev)]M,v = true iff ((F(t1) , F(t2)},w} E F(ev).
5. [Dt(<P)]M,u =true iff [<!J]M,v' =true for every w' such that R(F(t),w,w'). The interesting definitions are the last two. Defini tio� 5 says that a sentence is inevitable in a world w at a time t iff it is true in all worlds that share a common history with w up to time t. Definition 6 says that the probability of a sentence ¢ is at least a in a world w at a time t iff the probability of those accessible worlds in which ¢ is true is at least a. A sentence ¢ is satisfied by a model M at a world w if it is assigned the value true in that model and world. A sentence is valid if it is satisfied by every model at every world.
The following are some examples of valid sen tences.
• The past is determined:
• If something is inevitable, it is certain:
• Inevitability persists:
• We also have the following rule of probabilistic detachment:
As a consequence of the characteristics we have im posed on probability, there is an interesting relation ship between probabilities assigned to the same sen tence at various times. The relationship is that the probability of a sentence at some time given that its probability at some future time is at least a should be at least a: P,1 ( ¢> I P,, ( ¢>) 2: a) 2: a. 
Every instance of this schema is valid in the temporal probability models.
As a direct consequence of Miller's principle, the probability at a given time is the expected value of the probability at any future time. This will be called the ezpected value principle. Miller's princi ple and the expected value principle are useful be cause they allow the current probabilities of facts and events to be inferred from the probabilities of their future probabilities. For example, suppose that I am :first going to randomly choose between two coins, one fair coin and one with a 70% chance of heads, and then I am going to flip the chosen coin.
There is a 50% chance that the coin will have a 70% chance of landing heads and a 50% chance that the coin will have a 50% chance of landing heads. By the expected value principle, it follows that there is now a 60% chance that the coin flip will result in heads.
Causality
It was stated in the introduction that one of the intended uses of this logic is for reasoning about ac tion effects. The primary relationship between an action and its effects is the causal relationship. Sup pes (1970} provides an elegant theory of probabilistic causality. He gives three "prima facie" conditions which are necessary for event A to cause event E. Note that his theory was developed in the context of instantaneous events. In the sentences below, At• denotes that event A occurs at time t' and Et de �otes that event E occurs at time t.
1. Temporal precedence: t' � t 2. Possibility of cause: P(At) > 0 3. Positive influence: P(Et)A,,) > P(Et)
These three conditions can be restated in the logic of time intervals. The three conditions stated for event A that occurs in the interval t.A to tA' and event E that occurs in the interval tE to tE' are 1. Te mporal non-succession: t.A -< tE• 2. Possibility of cause: P,A(OCC(A,t.A,tA•)) > 0 3. Positive influence:
Now it can be shown that because of the way objec tive probability has been defined, condition 3) en tails both conditions 1) and 2). This result shows that the model of objective probability has captured the temporal :flow of causal ity as intended -actions cannot affect the past. As a consequence of this result, if we use condition 3) to define what it means for a plan to achieve a goal then we can prove that actions after the time of the goal cannot contribute to achieving the goal.
The ability of the logic to represent and distin guish between truth and probability allows us to distinguish between potential causation and actual causation. Suppes [1970, pages 37-41] defines ac tual causation as potential causation that actually occurs:
OCC(E, tE, tE') A P, .... (OCC(E, tE, tE' )IOCC(A, tA, tA•)) > P, .... (OCC(E, tE, tE•))
Examples
In this section two examples ill ustrating the use of the logic are presented. The first example involves reasoning about the state of the world and the in fluence of the world state on the consequences of actions. Suppose I own a car that is not very reli able and often does not start if the weather is too cold. My car starts 30% of the time when the tem perature is below freezing. Suppose that there is an 80% chance the temperature will be below freezing tomorrow morning. What is the chance that my car will start tomorrow morning? The first sentence can be represented as:
P,0(0CC(t,t,.,start) I OCC(turn-key, t, t,•) A HOLDS(t, t,•, below-freezing)) = .3
The second sentence can be represented as:
Pt 0 (HOLDS(tM,tM•, below-freezing))= .8
We also know that I will try to start my car sometime during tomorrow morning:
(to --< tM j t, --< t,• :::; tM') In most cases it is not possible to take two carry on bags if the plane is full. There is a 50% chance that the plane will be full this evening. What is the chance that carrying both bags on simultaneously will be a feasible course of action? The situation can be described by the following three sentences P notD (-.Oh [OCC(carry-b1, t1, t2)/\ OCC(carry-b2, t1, t2)] I HOLDS{plane-full, h, t2)) = .8 P n otD(HOLDS(plane-full, t11 t2)) = .5 now --< t1 --< t2
One possible model satisfying these sentences is shown in figure 2 . The labels "OCCURS" and "-.OCCURS" designate the co-occurrence and non co-occurrence of the two actions, respectively. Note that in worlds w1 -W4 we have -.o,, t1, t2 From the first two sentences it follows that Pn., ( -.o,. [DCC( ca:rry-bl 
So there is at least a 40% chance that carrying both bags simultaneously will not be feasible.
Furthermore, an upper bound on the current prob ability of the co-occurence of the two actions can be calculated. By the relation between possibility and probability
and by the expected value property The present work departs from Pelavin 's frame work in two major ways. First, points are taken to be the primitive temporal objects rather than intervals. Pelavin [1988, p84] himself notes that this results in a more natural definition of the accessibility rela tion. Second, and more importantly, the language can represent uncertainty. Representing uncertainty with objective probability eliminates the need for 153 a separate counterfactual operator and its seman tic counterpart: the similarity measure over worlds . The standard deterministic counterfactual operator is replaced by conditional probability. Skyrms [1980] provides an elegant probabilistic account of counter factuals based on the notion of objective probability.
The \emporal models we have presented are es sentially those of van Fraassen(1980] . He presents a semantic theory that models subjective probabil ity and objective chance, using a future-branching model of time points. In his models, objective prob ability can change with time but truth values can not. He shows that a property equivalent to Mill er's principle holds between subjective probability and objective chance but not between objective chance at different times. He also does not provide a logical language. The probability logic we have presented is patterned after Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo's [1988] logic. They discuss axiomatizations and de cision procedures for various probability logics. The logics presented are not formulated in a temporal framework.
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Future Research
This paper has presented a logic for reasoning about objective probability. It is important for a plan ning representation to be able to represent the state of knowledge of the planning agent. This can be done by introducing subjective probabilities into the logic. Several philosophers have discussed the prob lem of combining subjective probability and objec tive chance [Skyrms, 1980, Appendix 2] [Lewis, 1980; van Fraassen, 1980] . The general consensus is that agents have subjective beliefs concerning objective chance and the two are related by certain con straints, although there is disagreement as to pre cisely what the constraints should be. It can be shown that such a hybrid representation of beliefs is necessary in order to make rational decisions in some cases where causality is a factor [Skyrms, 1980, ch IIC] [Lewis, 1981; Maher, 1987) . Extending the logic with subjective probability is relatively straightfor ward. Subjective probability can be modeled by defining probability functions over all worlds, not just the accessible ones. Corresponding to the two types of probability in the models, there would be two probability operators in the object language. Previous work Haddawy and Frisch, 1990] has shown that probability logic can be viewed as a generalization of modal logic. It has been shown [Gaifman, 1988; Haddawy and Frisch, 1990 ] that the logics corresponding to staged prob ability models, similar to the temporal probability models presented here, are closely related to certain modal logics. It would be interesting to see whether the probability logic presented in this paper corre sponds exactly to some temporal modal logic. Such a modal logic would be useful in providing a qualitative representation of probabilistic ·information.
The logic presented in this paper is propositional. Adding a theory of quantification would greatly en hance the expressive power of the language.
In this paper no distinction has been made be tween the representation of actions and other events. But there are important distinctions. Actions have events associated with them but additionally actions are performed by an agent. An agent attempts an action and if the conditions are right, the action oc curs. For example, I attempt to lift an object and if the object is not too heavy, I succeed in lifting it. The author is currently elaborating the ontology presented in this paper to distinguish between action attempts and action occurrences.
